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Dancing with Macro-Boycotters: The Case of Arla Foods 
 
Purpose: Consumer boycotting is on the increase for various reasons. Macro-
boycotting campaigns, against one or more countries and their companies rather than 
a specific single company, have had devastating effects on companies. Thus, learning 
from the way in which Arla Foods has combated such a ferocious campaign is useful 
for companies that are facing similar campaigns and would help in developing a 
successful marketing strategy during and after boycotting campaigns.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: Secondary data were collected through various 
sources. Importantly, primary data were collected using interviews with senior 
managers at Arla Foods and a survey of 254 customers in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Findings: The come-back strategy developed and used by Arla Foods has had a good 
and positive impact and has helped the company to regain most of the market share it 
lost at the beginning of the boycotting campaign. Several steps were developed to 
combat the boycotting and regain the market.  
 
Originality/value: The unique position of Arla Foods during the boycotting 
campaign, which was unprecedented, creates a new challenge which requires new 
thinking of how to combat such severe and sudden change in the market conditions. 
Thus, as the frequency of boycotting is on the increase, the case study outlined a 
number of steps which can be adopted by other international companies. 
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Dancing with Macro-Boycotters: The Case of Arla Foods 
 
Introduction 
In August 2005, a Danish tabloid (Jyllands-Posten) ran a competition for the depiction 
of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH). Some of the drawings were published by the 
Danish tabloids. This caused massive shockwaves across the Middle East. Consumers 
of Danish products across the region started a long and painful boycott. Before the 
start of the boycotting campaign, Arla Foods had enjoyed a market lead during the 
last few decades. As the boycotting intensified, Arla Foods needed to develop a new 
strategy to combat the boycotting in which it had been caught. Devising a new 
strategy during a very unique and difficult situation requires a delicate balance 
between the reaction that has to be taken and the influence it may create on 
customers‟ perception of the company. 
 
The case study uses secondary and primary data. Secondary data were used mainly for 
gathering information on the development of boycotting campaigns in the Middle 
East and the influence on Arla Foods. Interviews with three senior managers in the 
headquarters of Arla Foods in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, were used to properly 
understand the way in which Arla Foods analysed, reacted to, and developed its 
marketing strategy to combat the macro-boycotting campaign in order to recover what 
it lost, and reclaim its position in the market. The case study also surveys 254 
customers in order to provide some statistical description of customer attitude towards 
boycotting. 
 
Macro-Boycotting Versus Micro-Boycotting 
Boycotting is defined as a “concerted refusal to do business with a particular person 
or business in order to obtain concessions or to express displeasure with certain acts 
or practice of person or business” (Garrett, 1987, p. 46). Boycotts are predicted to be 
an increased force and will constitute bigger challenges to marketers in the future 
(Gelb, 1995). John and Klein (2003, p. 1208) pointed out “boycotts are now a major 
tool for consumer protest groups, and are likely to become even more significant in 
the future.” Few studies have focused on consumer boycotts (Friedman, 1985; Garrett, 
1987; Klein et al., 2004). This handful of studies into consumer boycotts focused 
exclusively on consumer boycotts of a firm‟s product (micro-boycotting). Most 
studies (e.g. Garrett, 1987; Smith, 1990; Friedman, 1995; Sen et al., 2001; John and 
Klein, 2003) focused on understanding the micro-level of the phenomenon of 
boycotting at the firm level by examining the “egregious act” and the motives of 
boycott decisions.  
 
However, a new level of consumer boycotts appears to be emerging. Macro-boycotts 
are directed at policies and actions not made by a firm but rather by a government of 
the country of origin of a firm. Although there was the example of consumers 
boycotting of Anti-Apartheid in Britain where consumers boycotted South African 
products, boycotting a country and its firms‟ products is complex, under-researched 
and least explored. In recent years, macro-boycotting campaigns have become 
increasingly a major method in consumer protests, and little is understood about their 
influence on firms‟ competitiveness in international markets. Unlike micro-boycotting 
which can cause a short-term drop in sales for the boycotted company, macro-
boycotting lasts a lot longer with more profound effects on companies that share the 
same country of origin. Micro-boycotting is limited to the company that is perceived 
to initiate the “egregious act”, whereas macro-boycotting may be limited to one 
country but all brands that are associated with it can be subject to boycotting. Thus, 
strong and well-recognised brands associated with the country that acts egregiously 
are more likely to be hit hard by macro-boycotting campaigns even if these brands 
have nothing to do with the act itself. Country of origin traditional methods and 
tactics typically followed in international marketing (e.g. Nagashima, 1970; Han, 
1989; Al-Sulaiti and Baker, 1998) may not necessarily work during macro-boycotting. 
Thus, many firms during macro-boycotting will try to distance themselves from the 
“egregious act” by changing the labels of products, removing the „made in‟ sign, 
localising their activities, etc. However, reducing the effects of macro-boycotting will 
require the development and implementation of different and combined approaches 
where relational communication lies at the heart of its success.  
 
Clearly, the literature on macro-boycotting is scarce. This scarcity of studies focusing 
on macro-boycotting means that there is an urgent need by academics and 
practitioners to learn more about this rapidly developing phenomenon. In order to 
fulfil part of this gap in our understanding, the current case of the macro-boycotting of 
Arla Foods in the Middle East can help international firms understand, as well as 
academics‟ investigation of this phenomenon. 
 
Arla Foods 
The Danish company Arla Foods is a global dairy group with production facilities in 
11 countries, sales offices in 24 countries, and it sells its products in over 100 
countries. Arla Foods started its operation in the Middle East some 40 years ago. Soon 
after its entry into the Middle Eastern market, it became the market leader, mainly 
because of the absence of any credible local competitors at a time when the Middle 
East was still in its early economic development. Over the years, Arla Foods has 
maintained its position as market leader in the Middle East in cheese, butter and 
cream production. In the mid-1980s, Arla Foods started to operate the Danya Foods‟ 
dairy in Saudi Arabia‟s capital, Riyadh. The production facilities in Riyadh are seen 
to enhance and strengthen its position as market leader in the region. It employs more 
than 1,200 people across the Middle East, most working in Saudi Arabia. Since its 
early days in the Middle East until the end of 2005, Arla Foods has enjoyed excellent 
brand recognition, as indicated by the Executive Director of the Overseas Division, 
Finn Hansen (2005): “consumer awareness of our brands is on a par with, say, Coca 
Cola.”1  
 
The Boycott 
In early 2006 Arla Foods lost its market lead due to the boycotting campaign carried 
out throughout the Middle East against Danish products.
2
 The “egregious act” was 
carried out by the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten publishing 12 cartoons. The 
publication by a Danish tabloid in 2005 of a series of caricatures of the prophet 
Mohammed, some of them depicting him as a terrorist, sparked uproar across the 
Middle East.
3
 As consumers started to boycott Danish products, the trade boycott 
followed shortly after with the announcement by major local retailers such as Al-
Othaim Holding and Azizia Panda of their withdrawal of all Danish products from 
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 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/10/AR2006021001821_pf.html  
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 http://www.thelocal.se/10956/20080407/  
their shelves.
4
 Arla Foods‟ brands, such as Lurpak butter, Puck cream cheese, Three-
Cows white cheese and Dano powdered milk, felt the double impact of both the 
consumer and the trade boycott. The most intense boycotting campaigns were carried 
out in Saudi Arabia, the biggest market in the Middle East. Arla Foods‟ products were 
withdrawn from more than 50,000 stores across the region in less than five days 
losing over 60% of its market. Arla Foods lost $1.8 million in sales per day across the 
Middle East. The managing director Peder Tuborgh stated that any recovery would 
“take years” (cited in Arla Foods, 2006b). The main Saudi competitor „Almarai‟ took 
advantage of the cartoon crisis and took the lead in the market. The general manager 
of Arla Foods in Saudi Arabia, Erik Folden, said “Almarai is the biggest winner from 
the boycott.” Today, Almarai is still the leader in the market. 
 
The boycotting campaigners were successful in posting the images of Danish brands 
on the internet calling upon consumers to boycott these bands.
5
 Also, mobile phone 
messages carrying boycott lists of Danish products were widely circulated. Similarly, 
a number of retail stores put all Danish brands including Arla Foods‟ in a special 
section on one side of the store accompanied by a large notice calling on consumers 
not to buy. At the same time, Western stores doing business in the region have tried to 
limit the damage to their own reputations. For example, the French-owned 
supermarket chain Carrefour stopped selling Danish goods, while several firms, 
including the Swiss food multinational Nestle, placed advertisements in Saudi 
newspapers to counter rumours that their products were made in Denmark. 
 
Product boycotts are not new, but in this case it was organised, widespread, and quite 
devastating in its impact.
6
 Demonstrations were organised and in some countries they 
reached riot level.
7
 Two drivers of Arla Foods‟ official cars and distribution lorries 
were attacked. The headquarters‟ premises were stoned, and threats were issued by 
demonstrators. The impact was such that Arla Foods was forced to close its plant in 
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Riyadh, lay off employees in Denmark for ten weeks and postpone its plan to double 
sales in the region by 2010.
8
 
 
The Fight-Back by Arla Foods 
Over 40 years of marketing investment and brand building have been undermined in 
the blink of an eye. With macro-boycotting in action and with no previous experience 
in boycotting behaviour, the whole situation was unique and new to the senior 
managers of Arla Foods. There were no tried and tested damage limitation strategies 
because the campaign was unprecedented. Faced with an unenviable task, the general 
manager, Erik Folden, and the marketing manager, Torben Terp Hansen, in Arla 
Foods‟ headquarters in Saudi Arabia considered ways of restoring faith in Arla Foods‟ 
brands. They realised that successful boycotting campaigns can have a short-term 
impact on sales and a long-term impact on a company‟s most precious asset, its 
reputation and its brand. The main intention was to protect the brand by distancing 
Arla Foods‟ brands from the egregious trigger of the boycotting campaign.  
 
The initial reaction from Arla Foods was to keep silent. “Consumer sentiments were 
high and we knew it was not the right time yet to address our society. „Silence is 
golden‟ and we‟ve kept it for almost 45 days” (Torben Terp Hansen). During this 
period, Arla Foods‟ executives worked on developing “a comeback strategy” 
involving seven steps. The first step started by condemning the egregious act. An Arla 
Foods‟ manager appeared in every newspaper and on major TV stations across the 
region condemning the act. The second step revolved around the International Support 
of the Prophet Conference on 23
rd
 March 2006 in Bahrain.
9
 The conference discussed 
Arla Foods‟ statement and issued a religious recommendation, a „Fatwa‟ (religious 
statement that should be obeyed), to maintain the boycott on Danish products; 
however, Arla Foods were exempted from the boycotting.
10
 The Bahrain statement 
cleared Arla Foods of any responsibility and emphasised that Arla Foods should not 
be punished by the action of the others.  
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 In the third step, the company made the Bahrain statement public. To serve this 
purpose, a statement was published in all newspapers and TV channels thanking the 
conference for removing Arla Foods from the boycott list.
11
 The Bahrain statement 
was attached alongside the company‟s statement. A printed version of the statement 
was placed on the doors of outlets.
12
 Soon after, Arla Foods organised a Press & 
Trade Conference in Riyadh, which was attended by the major retailers and 
spearheaded by Al-Othaim Holding. The aim was to persuade the retailers to make a 
collective decision to accept Arla Foods back onto their shelves. Although Arla Foods 
was successful in restarting its relationships with some of the retailers, it failed to 
secure the support from the big retailer Azizia Panda, which is still boycotting Arla 
Foods today. Nonetheless, the company published another „thank you statement‟ 
through the media but this time it was for those retailers who accepted Arla Foods 
back. The statement contained the logos of the retailers who agreed to sell Arla 
Foods‟ brands.13  
 
The fourth step was getting back to the stores. Now the retailers were safe in taking 
back Arla Foods‟ products because of Arla Foods‟ position on the cartoons. 
REUTERS television covered the return of Arla Foods‟ brands to stores across the 
region. Despite all of the statements and coverage, some customers maintained their 
boycott. This meant that step five had to focus on promotion. Given the huge product 
stock returns from markets since the boycott started and because customers are price 
sensitive, heavy consumer and trade offers were made to entice retailers and 
consumers to break their boycott.  
 
Arla Foods became more proactive, focusing on the corporate and brand 
communication in step six. Two main messages were at the heart of its 
communication. Firstly, it informed the public about its position on the cartoon.
14
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Secondly, it reminded consumers about the long heritage Arla Foods has in the 
region. The communication platform for all brands was aligned with the corporate 
one, and phrases such as “40 years with you” and “together for generations” were 
used. Brand communication was designed to show understanding of the region‟s 
values, culture and sentiments. However, this communication strategy was tactical 
and situational. Two months later, this strategy was replaced in step seven by the 
long-term brand communication. This was seen as an important step to gain back the 
hearts and minds of consumers. To achieve this, heavy investments were made into 
charities, social activities and social responsibility campaigns: product donations, ties 
with official governmental bodies, children‟s cancer activities, donations of 
ambulances to Saudi Red Crescent, who in turn donated them to the Palestinian Red 
Crescent, etc.
15
 These activities, which still continue today, are aimed to have an 
impact on the perception of Arla Foods across the Middle East, more specifically in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
Is It Really Over? 
A year after the boycotting campaign started (end of 2006), Arla Foods has recovered 
most of its market share in most Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of 
Saudi Arabia where it has only recovered 50%. In 2008 Arla Foods managed to 
recover 70% of what it lost at the beginning of the boycott in Saudi Arabia. For Arla 
Foods to regain its initial market lead in Saudi Arabia, it would mean regaining the 
diehard boycotters. 
 
The boycotting against Arla Foods has lasted a lot longer than it usually takes. The 
boycotting of the American products faded quite quickly, after a few weeks only. The 
intensity and the scale of the boycotting against the American products did not force 
American companies to react in the way Arla Foods has had to do. This is because 
macro-boycotting is more severe compared to micro-boycotting since it triggers 
different historical, political, religious and cultural emotions. Although Arla Foods 
has used good recovery strategies, the uniqueness of its case meant the challenge is 
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not yet over. This was supported by the primary data
16
 collected during 2007/2008 
from which 88.8% of respondents said they took part in the boycotting and only 
11.2% did not boycott. About 31% of the respondents maintained their boycotting for 
about six months, 34.1% maintained their boycott for one year, and about 34.9% of 
respondents determined to maintain their boycotting permanently. Boycotters appear 
to mainly target the United States and Denmark. However, the data show about 
53.97% of customers boycott Denmark only and about 38.49% boycott both the 
United States and Denmark, with a very small percentage boycotting other countries. 
When examining customers‟ motives to boycott, about 75.9% of customers boycott 
Danish companies because of religious reasons, while customer motives to boycott 
the United States appear to be mainly political and military reasons. 
 
Take in Figure 1. 
 
Arla Foods‟ boycott comes mainly from those customers who are somewhat familiar 
with Arla Foods‟ products. This is why the boycott has been quite painful for Arla 
Foods. However, this fact may also explain some of the success that Arla Foods has 
made since the start of the boycott. Since many customers are familiar with the Arla 
Foods‟ brand and understand its long history in the country, Arla Foods has directed 
its communication strategy well, emphasising the long relationship it has with 
customers in the country. 
 
Take in Figure 2. 
 
Implications for International Companies 
The case of Arla Foods and its strategy in first coping with the macro-boycotting and, 
second, becoming more proactive in combating macro-boycotting has different 
implications which international companies can learn from. International companies 
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can be very vulnerable during macro-boycotting as they are caught in the middle 
between the trigger of macro-boycotting (country of origin) and consumers.  
 
The most important step that companies should be doing is increasing their awareness 
about this type of boycotting. Good communication strategy is vital, which should be 
done on different levels. Firstly, there should be corporate responses to the trigger of 
boycotting. Companies must deal with the trigger of boycotting (the egregious act) 
immediately and must explain its position clearly and widely. Arla Foods would have 
not have been excluded from the macro-boycott if Arla Foods had not been quick to 
distance itself from the perceived egregious act. The media is crucial in managing 
public relations, especially during a turbulent time. What has helped Arla Foods 
during the campaign is partly its long history in the region and the positive perception 
of its brand. Thus, international companies should invest in developing better brand 
relationship and brand emotion or attachment. This can help in regaining consumers 
during macro-boycotting. Secondly, organisers of macro-boycotting campaigns work 
hard to spread rumours. Thus companies must respond to these rumours effectively. 
False rumours have the potential to harm companies‟ reputation and must be 
encountered before rumours enter consumers‟ belief system. Care should be paid to 
the manner of responding to these rumours. Forceful responses can generate 
undesirable outcomes and a delicate balance has to be maintained. However, 
companies may run the risk of dismaying consumers in their own country of origin 
depending on the type of trigger of macro-boycotting. Thirdly, charitable donations 
can help soften consumer feeling and improve perception of the companies. However, 
donations must not be advertised by companies and should be left to the media to 
report. Fourthly, companies should be seen to work with the country of origin‟s 
government and other governments to create a positive dialogue aimed at healing 
consumer feeling and ending the egregious act.  
 
Conclusion 
The case study explained the difficulties facing Arla Foods during the boycotting 
against Denmark, in which Arla Foods has been „caught in the middle‟ because of its 
country of origin. The boycott was severe due to the fact that the trigger of the macro-
boycott was based on what had been perceived by customers as disrespect of religious 
values. The boycott was also effective because of the effectual organisation of the 
boycotting campaign. The challenge for Arla Foods was how to distance itself from 
the cause of the boycott without alienating its customers in Denmark. The „comeback 
strategy‟ developed by Arla Foods was effective, and they clearly made a good 
recovery in a rather reasonably short time. 
 
As the boycotting phenomenon has become more frequent in the past few years, 
international companies can learn a great deal from the way in which Arla Foods 
handled and managed the boycotting. The steps followed by Arla Foods in regaining 
its market share are particularly useful for international companies. The emphasis on 
managing the crisis using a more relational approach is certainly plausible within the 
context of the Middle Eastern culture. 
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